The Condorcet Jury Theorem under Ambiguity
The Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT) serves as powerful evidence of the epistemic merits of the majority rule. The classical theorem assumes voter competence, i.e., that every voter is more likely than a coin flip to vote for the correct option. This paper reevaluates if and how we can presuppose voter competence in light of ambiguity. I argue that voter competence can fail if voters' beliefs are imprecise, even if we assume seemingly epistemically advantageous conditions such as rationality, honesty, and minimal fidelity of beliefs. The paper highlights that collective decision-making rules that perform well in situations of risk might not extend to collective decision-making under ambiguous prospects. As one solution to these results, the paper advocates including abstention as a voting option.
Strategyproofness for Equality's Sake
This paper argues that strategic voting can create power imbalances between citizens. This can be problematic insofar that we might be committed to the principle "one person one vote" on the basis that everyone should have the same opportunity to influence political decisions. Yet, equal votes and equal voting power can come apart in non-ideal settings, namely, when voters don't have the same ability to vote strategically. Thus this paper spells out a new normative foundation for strategyproofness.
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Work in Process
Don't forget the normative: On how to measure manipulation
This paper aims to highlight the normative dimension of different solutions to prevent manipulation. To do this, the paper focuses on two ways to measure how effectively a solution disincentivizes strategic reporting of attitudes. I will concentrate on two popular approaches in the literature: the Nitzan-Kelly index and the practice of evaluating the complexity class of strategic voting given a certain social choice rule. I will discuss which, if any, of the aforementioned approaches is an appropriate measure that accurately reflects the harm of violating strategyproofness. In essence, the message of the paper is quite simple: What legitimizes a particular institutional design (e.g., a voting rule) also determines the potential harm of manipulation. This potential harm, in turn, is crucial to determining which measure of manipulation is appropriate.
Heuristic Strategic Voting: Why more votes doesn’t mean more manipulation
This is a paper based on a simulation that I wrote which models voters as boundedly rational. They vote repeatedly (such as reacting to polls) and use a simple rule to make strategic decisions instead of orthodox rational choice theory. The results suggest, contrary to the literature, that giving voters more votes will not necessarily lead to more strategic effects on the outcome.
On the possibility to analyze strategic voting in Saari’s geometrical framework
Donald Saari claims in his work on the geometry of voting that euclidean distance can serve as a measure to vulnerability to strategic voting of a specific election. This paper tests this claim and concludes that none of the common notions of vulnerability to strategic voting matches euclidean distance in his geometric analysis of voting.
Paul Klee Pavillon der Zahlen, 1918 (Pavilion of Numbers)