Current Research
 

  My research is primarily driven by variations of the question of how individuals relate to groups, especially in the context of decision-making. I often investigate formalized relationships between groups and individuals, such as those found in voting systems or algorithmic decision-making systems.
Currently, my research focuses on the prevention of manipulation in collective decision making mechanisms. To address this issue comprehensively, I draw upon philosophy of social science to determine what makes appropriate descriptive idealizations, particularly when constructing models with normative implications. Connected to this, I think it is wise to evaluate the descriptive accuracy of rational choice theory for a diverse range of agents (e.g., boundedly rational agents or algorithms). Moreover, an essential dimension intertwined with this topic is the normative assessment of strategic voting that connects with political philosophy, welfare economics, and epistemology.



Peer Reviewed Publications
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The paper evaluates the Condorcet Jury Theorem under ambiguity. It explores the effects on voter competence assumption when voters are faced with situations they can’t ascribe a single probability anymore. In contrast to voting in situations where voters can do so, this paper shows that voters can fail to vote competently in situations under ambiguity even if they are honest, practically rational and epistemically competent. Thus, the conditions under which we can guarantee voter competence become obscure, namely, conditions that guarantee voter competence under risk do not guarantee voter competence under ambiguity. The second contribution is a more positive one. There is a fruitful research project that identifies collective decision procedures better suited for less idealised uncertainty frameworks. In relation to this, the paper shows how allowing abstention can have positive effects on the epistemic benefits of voting and extends the Condorcet Jury Theorem. 

Other Publications
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Completed Manuscripts 

On Equality, Power and
Strategic Voting

This paper argues that strategic voting can create power imbalances between citizens. This can be problematic insofar that we might be committed to the principle "one person one vote" on the basis that everyone should have the same opportunity to influence political decisions. Yet, equal votes and equal voting power can come apart in non-ideal settings, namely, when voters don't have the same ability to vote strategically. Thus this paper spells out a new normative foundation for strategy-proofness.

Models, Measurement and Manipulability 

Different metrics of manipulability  disagree on their assessment on how vulnerable a particular collective decision mechanism is to manipulation. Surprisingly, little attention has been paid to the normative assumptions that underlie these assessments. First, I contend that concerns about manipulation in the case of voting can be grounded in both welfarist and relational egalitarian considerations. I then demonstrate that these distinct value commitments can render different metrics appropriate for normative guidance in the selection of voting rules. Finally, I argue that the adoption of a single value framework for manipulation risks circularity and that the literature needs to aim to develop multiple metrics that track different value judgement about manipulation. Thus, the paper calls for the developments of multiple metrics for the vulnerability to manipulation along with different value judgments that underlie the evaluation of manipulation.

Feel free to contact me for a copy!​

Work in Process
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Heuristic Strategic Voting: Why more votes doesn’t mean more manipulation
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  This is a paper based on a simulation that I wrote which models voters as boundedly rational. They vote repeatedly (such as reacting to polls) and use a simple rule to make strategic decisions instead of orthodox rational choice theory. The results suggest, contrary to the literature, that giving voters more votes will not necessarily lead to more strategic effects on the outcome. 

Newcomb's Problem Revisted (with Jan Woike)

This paper is based on six experiments related to Newcomb's Problem. It focuses on the correlation between reasoning fallacies and one-boxing or two-boxing choices, as well as the variations in decision-making when participants are faced with an algorithmic predictor.

Consensus for Whom?
Polarization on Significant Truths (with Shira Ahissar)

We employ epistemic networks to analyze the impact of informational asymmetries between dominant and marginalized groups. One finding is that the uncertainty over which proposition is discussed can drive polarization and especially deprive marginalized groups of epistemic benefits. Moreover, marginaized groups improve relatively to dominant groups epistemically when they develop distrust against others’ evidence.

Paul Klee Pavillon der Zahlen, 1918 (Pavilion of Numbers)